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This study examines whether bidders’ post-merger operat-
ing performance are affected by their CEO behavior, premiums
paid to the target firms, the period of mergers, the method of
payment, the industry of merged firms, capital liquidity, and
their pre-merger operating performance. Testing the U.S. suc-
cessful merger and acquisition data for the period of 1990s, this
study finds that in-wave mergers, intra-industry mergers, the
payment of lower premiums, and better pre-merger operating
performance drive the bidders to produce better post-merger
operating performance. Three measures of CEO behavior—the
main predictor scrutinezed in this study—are proposed and
examined, and the results demonstrate that the effects of these
measures on post-merger operating performance are mixed,
suggesting that each of the behavioral measures designed in this
study may capture CEO behavior in different ways.
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Introduction
The results of the tests on post-
merger operating performance indi-
cate that performance following merg-
ers undertaken during the wave period
is worse than that during other periods
Soegiharto (2008). On the other hand,
Harford’s (2005) study does not find
evidence that performance following
the wave period mergers is worse than
that during other periods. Instead, post-
merger changes in sales growth are
significantly greater inside the waves.
While the findings by earlier studies are
consistent with the behavioral explana-
tion of merger waves, the results of
latter studies are in line with the neo-
classical explanation of merger waves.
This suggests that both the neoclassi-
cal and the behavioral explanation of
merger waves have some supports.
The aim of this study is to examine
whether there is a difference in post-
merger operating performance between
mergers occurring during merger
waves and those outside the waves,
between mergers undertaken by over-
confident and those by less overconfi-
dent CEOs, between stock and cash
mergers, between within and cross-
industrial mergers, and between merg-
ers conducted in a high and those in a
low liquidity year. Moreover, this study
also investigates whether five vari-
ables—CEO overconfidence, merger
period, payment method, the industry
of merged firms, and capital liquidity—
and premium paid to the target firm
predict post-merger operating perfor-
mance.
This study re-examines the rela-
tionship between post-merger operat-
ing performance and payment method
used to finance the merger, and also
between post-merger operating per-
formance and the industry of merged
firms since empirical evidence on these
relationships are mixed and research-
ers of the previous studies did not take
into account merger waves and CEO
overconfidence in their analyses (see
e.g., Ghosh 2001; Healy et al. 1992;
Heron and Lie 2002; Linn and Switzer
2001). The findings of this study indi-
cate that merger period and the indus-
try of merged firms positively and sig-
nificantly affect the post-merger oper-
ating performance. Additionally, the
premium paid to target firms is nega-
tively and significantly associated with
post-merger operating performance. It
is also found that the pre-merger per-
formance has a positive and significant
effect on the post-merger performance.
Eventually, CEO overconfidence, the
variable of principal interest in this
study, does not exert any effect on the
post-merger operating performance.
The outline of this paper is as
follows: Literature review and empiri-
cal predictions are presented in Sec-
tions 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4
describes data and methods employed,
and Section 5 presents and discusses
the results of this paper. Section 6
concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Although merger and acquisition
(M&A) must be pre-approved by a
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firm’s entire board of directors, it is
widely recognized that the CEO ini-
tiates the M&A and oversees its
progress. In other words, the CEO
plays a central role in the M&A deci-
sion-making process (see e.g., Roll
1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Dur-
ing the decision-making process, the
CEO may be influenced by the time
when the merger is undertaken (in-
wave or non-wave), his or her own
behavior (overconfident or not), the
industry of the target firm (intra- or
inter-industry), and the method of pay-
ment (stock or cash) to be used to
complete the M&A. These factors,
which potentially affect the bidder’s
post-merger operating performance,
are examined in this study. This section
provides the review of relevant litera-
ture on these factors and the variable




A number of studies have investi-
gated the changes in the long-term
operating performance of acquiring and
target firms using post-merger account-
ing and cash flow data. The results of
those empirical studies are in general
inconsistent. While some research in-
dicates a significant improvement in
the post-merger operating performance
(e.g., Healy et al. 1992; Heron and Lie
2002; Switzer 1996), others document
a significant decline in the operating
performance following mergers (e.g.,
Clark and Ofek 1994; Kruse et al.
2002). In addition, some other studies
reveal insignificant changes in the post-
merger operating performance (e.g.,
Ghosh 2001; Herman and Lowenstein
1988).
A study by Healy et al. (1992),
which examined the operating perfor-
mance of the 50 largest mergers be-
tween 1979 and 1983 and compared
the post-merger performance to the
pre-merger performance of the merg-
ing firms, indicates that the merged
firms’ operating cash flows perfor-
mance in five years after the mergers
improve significantly relative to their
industry averages, substantiating the
conjecture that mergers are capable of
improving operating performance.
Employing the methodology of Healey
et al. (1992), Switzer (1996) examined
the changes in operating performance
of firms involved in 324 acquisitions
between 1967 and 1987. He verifies
several Healy et al.’s (1992) findings
and concludes, in particular, that the
results of Healy et al. (1992) are robust
to both sample size and the period of
examination. Moreover, the results of
Switzer’s (1996) study indicate that the
performance of the merged firms typi-
cally improves following their combi-
nation, which is consistent with that
presented by Healy et al. (1992).
Similar to Healy et al. (1992),
Andrade et al. (2001) also find that
post-merger operating margin (cash
flows to sales) on average strengthens
relative to the industry benchmark.
Specifically, they report the average
abnormal operating performance, mea-
sured as the discrepancy between the
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operating margin of combined firms
and the median operating margin of
corresponding industry. Their results
suggest that the operating performance
of the combined target and acquirer is
strong relative to their industry peers
preceding the merger, and slightly im-
proves in the wake of the merger
transaction. Also similar to Healy et al.
(1992), Heron and Lie (2002) find that
acquiring firms demonstrate greater
operating performance relative to their
industry counterparts prior to mergers
and, consistent with Healy et al. (1992)
and Switzer (1996), these firms con-
tinue to exhibit an operating perfor-
mance level in excess of their respec-
tive industries following the mergers.
Moreover, those firms significantly
outperform control firms with compa-
rable pre-event operating performance.
Clark and Ofek (1994) also ana-
lyze post-merger operating perfor-
mance. However, their study was de-
signed to specifically examine the ef-
fectiveness of mergers in restructuring
distressed firms, and investigate some
determinants of the success of those
mergers (using EBITD deflated by
sales revenues instead of market value
of equity, as in Healy et al. (1992)).
They collected a sample of takeovers
undertaken to restructure distressed
targets for the period between 1981
and 1988. They find that, unlike the
mergers of healthy firms studied by
Healy et al. (1992), the performance of
bidders that acquire distressed targets
tend to decline in the post-merger pe-
riod.
Merger Waves and Post-Merger
Operating Performance
Two general classes of explana-
tions of merger waves are: (1) neoclas-
sical model, where industries respond-
ing to shocks reorganize through M&As
and thereby generate a clustering of
merger activity (Harford 2005; Mitchell
and Mulherin 1996); and (2) behavioral
model, where rational CEOs take ad-
vantage of consistent pricing errors in
the market to buy real assets with their
overvalued stocks (Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan 2004; Shleifer and Vishny
2003). Under the first explanation, if
the wave is an efficient response to
economic shocks, it should be related
to more rational behavior. Hence, it is
expected that the improvement in post-
merger operating performance for in-
wave mergers is equal to or greater
than that for non-wave mergers. This
is more likely to occur as the bidder and
the target merge for synergy (there is
an economic rationale behind the
merger).
Under the second explanation, bid-
der CEOs may make valuation errors
and have an opportunity to pursue their
own interests at the expense of share-
holders during the merger waves since
the shareholders may have a more
difficult time analyzing the bidding firms
during those waves. Therefore, ac-
cording to this theory, the performance
of bidders is relatively lower for merg-
ers undertaken during the waves than
those conducted outside the waves. In
addition, the poor post-merger perfor-
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mance in the market-misvaluation1
mergers can also be explained by the
fact that these mergers are not under-
lain by economic factors that could
drive the merged firms to perform
better.
None of the behavioral papers
explicitly formulates predictions con-
cerning operating performance. How-
ever, as explained above, one can de-
rive a prediction that the costs of inte-
grating two firms with no real com-
bined synergy (and hence no opera-
tional motive to merge) would produce
generally poor post-merger operating
performance for in-wave mergers.
Harford’s (2005) tests of operating
performance shows no evidence that
the changes in actual performance fol-
lowing in-wave mergers are worse
than those during other periods. Rather,
he argues that the post-merger change
in one of his measures of post-merger
performance (sales growth) remains
significantly greater inside the waves.
CEO Overconfidence and Post-
Merger Operating Performance
CEOs are particularly likely to
display overconfidence for three rea-
sons. First, individuals are more over-
confident about outcomes that they
believe are under their control
(Weinstein, 1980). Second, individuals
are especially overconfident about out-
comes to which they are highly com-
mitted (Weinstein, 1980). Third, over-
confidence is likely to be strongest
when the reference point is abstract
(Alicke et al., 1995). Linking overcon-
fidence to corporate finance, Roll
(1986) advances the idea that in corpo-
rate takeovers, the overconfidence
managers engage in M&As with an
overly optimistic opinion of their abili-
ties to create value. Similarly, Heaton
(2002) shows that common distortions
in corporate investments may be the
result of managers overestimating the
returns on their investments. These, in
turn, often lead to bidding firms paying
higher premiums for their targets. Roll
also argues that the mistake of paying
too much stems from management
who overrate the synergistic gains from
an M&A. Such overpayment is a prin-
cipal mechanism by which hubris ulti-
mately damages the operating perfor-
mance following the M&A.
Method of Payment and Post-
Merger Operating Performance
Empirical evidence suggests that
the means of payment is an important
determinant of the long-term post-ac-
quisition performance: cash offers are
associated with a stronger improve-
ment than takeovers involving other
forms of payment (Ghosh 2001; Linn
and Switzer 2001; Moeller and
Schlingemann 2004). A study by Healy
et al. (1992), which examined the oper-
ating performance of the 50 largest
merger transactions, reports that oper-
ating performance improves following
the transactions. However, they do not
1 Market-misvaluation merger is defined as a merger that results from managerial timing of market
overvaluation of their firm.
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find any relationship between post-
merger operating performance and the
method of payment utilized to finance
the mergers. Heron and Lie (2002)
also examined the relation between the
method of payment in mergers and
operating performance. Similar to Healy
et al. (1992), they also find that the
trends in industry-adjusted operating
performance (before and after merg-
ers) do not differ across cash mergers,
stock mergers, and mixed (cash and
stock) mergers. They subsequently
suggest that the method of payment
does not appear to convey information
with respect to future operating perfor-
mance. Likewise, Powell and Stark
(2005) and Sharma and Ho (2002) find
no significant relationship between the
method of payment and post-merger
operating performance.
As in Healy et al. (1992) and
Heron and Lie (2002), Ghosh (2001)
investigated the impact of the method
of payment on the acquiring firms’
post-merger operating cash flows. He
included 50 largest acquisitions each
year from 1981 to 1988, and adopted
the methodology harnessed by Healy
et al. (1992). Unlike Healy et al. (1992)
and Heron and Lie (2002), Ghosh (2001)
provides evidence that the combined
firms’ cash flows strengthen signifi-
cantly following cash mergers but de-
teriorate subsequent to stock mergers.
He argues that the improvement in
cash mergers results from the increase
in assets turnover (sales per dollar of
assets) and the decline in stock merg-
ers is due to a significant drop in the
assets turnover.
Industry of Merged Firms and
Post-Merger Operating
Performance
The establishment of diversified
firms is related to divisional managers
who have rent-seeking behavior
(Scharfstein and Stein 2000), bureau-
cratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz 1998),
and a bargaining problem within the
firm (Rajan et al. 2000). As these
drawbacks may outpace the alleged
synergies, the bidder CEOs may fail to
enhance post-merger operating per-
formance. Moreover, as suggested by
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), diversify-
ing mergers may be a consequence of
the agency problems between manag-
ers and shareholders. This, in turn, may
also produce the decline in corporate
performance following the mergers.
Several studies have been undertaken
to examine these assumptions. While
research conducted by Healy et al.
(1992) and Heron and Lie (2002) con-
firms these assumptions, other studies
done by Powell and Stark (2005), Linn
and Switzer (2001), Switzer (1996) and
Sharma and Ho (2002) find an insignifi-
cant relationship between diversifying
mergers and poor post-merger operat-
ing performance. In addition, the study
by Kruse et al. (2002) and Ghosh
(2001) find evidence that the inter-
industry mergers significantly outper-
form the intra-industry mergers.
Bid Premium and Post-Merger
Operating Performance
It is generally acknowledged that
additional value that can be extracted
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from target firms by bidder CEOs are
reflected in the premiums paid to the
targets. Premium also emphasizes a
bidder CEO’s belief that the target’s
present performance is poor and that
its stock price poorly reflects the value
of the firm’s resources and prospect.
In addition, premium is important not
only due to its function as the statement
of pricing and the bidder’s expectation,
but also because of its effect on the
ultimate merger performance (Hay-
ward and Hambrick 1997).
Roll (1986) argues that the mis-
take of paying too much which stems
from management overrating the value
created and synergistic gains from an
M&A ultimately damages the operat-
ing performance following the M&A.
Contrary to this argument, McCauley
(1997) examined whether the size of
an acquisition premium is an important
determinant of the ultimate success of
the M&A, and finds no correlation
between the percentage of premium
paid and the “success” of the M&A
based on an industry benchmark stan-
dard. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, it
is axiomatic that the higher the pre-
mium paid, the lower the ultimate oper-
ating performance to the acquirer in a
given acquisition.
Empirical Predictions
This study examines the effects of
the period of merger, CEO behavior,
the method of payment, the industry of
merged firms, and premiums paid to
target firms on post-merger operating
performance. For the interest of com-
pleteness, the impacts of liquidity pe-
riod, CEO tenure, CEO stock owner-
ship, pre-merger operating perfor-
mance, free cash flows, and leverage
are also tested.
Roll (1986) argues that bidder
CEOs are infected by hubris (overcon-
fidence). Their overconfidence may
cause them to overestimate the values
of target firms, overestimate their abili-
ties to manage the targets and reap the
gains/returns from the mergers, and
thereby not to act in the best interests
of shareholders. CEO hubris leads them
to pay higher premiums, and accord-
ingly those mergers are more likely to
be negative NPV projects for the bid-
ders. Hence, it is argued that CEO
overconfidence and the payment of
higher premium lead to poor post-
merger operating performance.
The incidence and manifestation
of CEO overconfidence are probably
time varying. Bradley et al. (1988) note
that multiple-bidding contests are more
likely to occur during merger waves,
and so during the wave period bidders
are more likely to offer higher premi-
ums as they are faced with greater
competition. Even bidders who do not
face open rivalry may pay higher pre-
miums during the merger waves to
forestall the possibility of other bidders
entering the race. The bidder CEOs
may also pay higher premiums during
the merger waves as they are more
inclined to make valuation errors. There-
fore, it is conjectured that mergers
undertaken during the merger waves
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would result in poor post-merger oper-
ating performance.
Bidder CEOs may pay higher pre-
miums for mergers that involve bidders
and targets from different industries.
This may occur since the bidder CEOs
might only have little experience, lim-
ited capabilities, and insufficient knowl-
edge of the targets’ businesses, and, in
turn, they may overvalue the targets.
Bidders tend to use stocks to finance
mergers when they believe their stocks
are overvalued. As their stocks are
overvalued, they are more readily avail-
able to pay higher premiums to the
target firms. In addition, the bid premi-
ums paid to the targets may be higher
when capital liquidity is high. As the
transaction costs are low (when the
capital liquidity is high), the bidder CEOs
may be more willing to pay more pre-
miums to complete the mergers. Hence,
it is more likely that inter-industry merg-
ers, stock mergers, and mergers un-
dertaken during the period of high li-
quidity would result in poor post-merger
operating performance.
A CEO with long tenure logically
has proven his or her skills in both good
and bad times, and the board of direc-
tors should have already obtained al-
most all required information on him or
her. As his or her tenure gets longer, he
or she might have more control over
the firm and has a stronger influence on
the board. With this power in hand,
CEOs tend to act not for the best
interests of shareholders, and may de-
stroy the values of mergers they under-
take by paying higher premiums to the
target firms in order to complete the
mergers which may be part of their
organizational strategy. On the other
hand, since a merger typically results in
a decrease in the acquirer’s stock price,
it follows that a CEO with more equity
or whose pay is more heavily weighted
towards equity-based incentives might
be less likely to undertake an M&A or
overpay the target firm. Therefore,
CEOs with high stock ownership may
have interests which are aligned with
those of shareholders. For this reason,
they may pay “fair” premiums in the
mergers they execute. Hence, it is
more likely that CEOs with longer
tenure would produce poorer post-
merger operating performance, and
CEOs with higher stock ownership
would generate better post-merger
operating performance.
CEOs with better pre-merger per-
formance may believe that their mana-
gerial abilities to run their firms suc-
cessfully can be applied to firms they
are acquiring. As they believe that the
acquired firms’ prospects will be better
in their hands or they could bring more
benefits to those firms, they would be
very willing to incur high premiums. It
is also convinced that CEOs with a high
level of free cash flows and a low level
of leverage will pay higher premiums.
Mergers that involve these CEOs may
also result in poor post-merger operat-
ing performance.
Predicated on the arguments dis-
cussed above, it is predicted that:
1. The post-merger operating perfor-
mance: (a) of bidders with overcon-
fident CEOs is poorer than that with
less overconfident CEOs, (b) of
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mergers undertaken during the in-
wave period is poorer than that
made during other (non-wave) pe-
riods, (c) of inter-industry mergers
is poorer than that of intra-industry
mergers, (d) of stock mergers is
poorer than that of cash mergers,
and (e) of mergers undertaken fol-
lowing a high liquidity year is poorer
than that following a low liquidity
year.
2. CEO overconfidence, in-wave
mergers, stock overvaluation, higher
bid premiums, higher capital liquid-
ity, inter-industry mergers, better
pre-merger performance, higher
pre-merger free cash flows, lower
pre-merger leverage, longer CEO
tenure, and lower CEO stock own-
ership lead to the bidders’ poor
post-merger operating perfor-
mance.
The two predictions formulated
above are summarized in Table 1, and
the empirical findings, discussed in




Data employed in this study are
identical to those used in the study of
Soegiharto (2010). They are collected
from the Securities Data Company’s
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions data-
base. The data gathered include the
U.S. M&A transactions that took place
during the period of January 1991 to
December 2000. Sample selection cri-
teria include: (1) the bidder and target
firms are publicly traded and (2) the
transaction value is at least US$60
million in 2005 dollars. These criteria
result in an initial sample of 3,182
M&As. The financial and stock price
data for merged companies are ex-
tracted from the Standard and Poor’s
COMPUSTAT Research Tape
(COMPUSTAT) and the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
databases, respectively. The require-
ment that all sample firms be listed on
these two databases reduces the
sample size to 729 mergers. The data
on sample CEOs are collected from
the Execucomp database. The data-
base provides comprehensive infor-
mation on various aspects of CEOs,
such as the dates they were appointed,
option packages including expiration
dates and exercise prices, and CEOs’
share ownership. However, the infor-
mation on options held by a CEO until
the year of expiration–which is used as
the proxy for CEO overconfidence–is
available only for the CEOs of acquir-
ing firms in 294 M&As. Thus, there is
a large drop in sample size.
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Measures of Overconfidence
This study uses measures of CEO
overconfidence designed by Soegiharto
(2010) who formulates the measures
based on several variables extracted
from the Execucomp database. Since
information on options held by the CEO
until the year of expiration is available
only for a small number of CEOs, it is
not possible for Soegiharto (2010) and
also this present study to apply
Malmendier and Tate’s (2003) method,
which collects the sample of CEOs
from Hall and Liebman’s data (1989)
and classifies a CEO as overconfident
when he or she holds stock options until
the last year before expiration.
Soegiharto (2010) proposes several
measures of CEO overconfidence
gauged prior to the year of merger
announcement. He argues that as his
measures of CEO overconfidence are
assessed prior to merger announce-
ment, they may better reflect the CEO
overconfidence in undertaking M&As.
The measures of CEO overconfidence
employed by Soegiharto (2010) and
applied in this study are listed below
(the Execucomp’s accessed items pre-
sented in italic)2:
1. Measure A. The proportion of stock
options exercised: soptexsh/
(soptexsh+uexnumex). Soptexsh
is the number of stock options exer-
cised by CEOs and uexnumex is
the number of unexercised vested
stock options. CEOs are classified
as overconfident if the percentage
of options they exercise is smaller
than both the annual average per-
centage and industry-year average
percentage.
2. Measure B. The number of shares
owned (shrown). CEOs are classi-
fied as overconfident if the number
of shares they own shows an in-
crease at the end of the year, irre-
spective of whether or not they
exercise their options.
3. Measure C. CEO behavior is mea-
sured using the net average value
realized from exercising options
(soptexer/soptexsh) and the aver-
age value the CEOs would have
realized at year end if they had
exercised all of their vested options
that had an exercise price below the
market price (inmonex/uex-
numex). CEOs are classified as
overconfident if inmonex/uex-
2 Initially, Soegiharto’s study (2010) proposes five measures of CEO behavior. The association
among the measures proposed are tested using the chi-square test and the results of the test show
that one measure is associated with the other measures, except for Measure 1 which has no association
with Measure 2 (Pearson statistic = 0.012, significance = 0.911), and for Measure 2 (then renamed
as Measure B) which has no association with Measure 5 (Pearson statistic = 0.888, significance =
0.346). Although Measure 1 has an association with Measure 5 (Pearson statistic = 43.937,
significance < 0.001), both measures are used in this study since the contingency coefficient from
the symmetric measures indicates a value of 0.380 with a significance of <0.001, suggesting that there
is a weak relationship between the two measures. Measure 1, Measure 2 and Measure 5 are then
renamed as Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C, respectively.
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numex is greater than soptexer/
soptexsh.
CEO overconfidence is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one for
an overconfident CEO and zero for a
less overconfident CEO.
Identification of Merger Waves
Soegiharto (2008) and Soegiharto
(2010) followed Harford’s (2005) simu-
lation procedure to identify M&A
waves. The procedure is implemented
as follows: each bidder and target is
sorted into one of 48 industry groups,
based on their respective SIC codes
(as per Fama and French 1997) at the
time of the bid announcement. Bidders
and targets from various sectors are
assigned to their own industries. For
each industry, the highest concentra-
tion of completed and uncompleted
merger bids involving firms in that in-
dustry within a 24-month period (over-
lap)—as per Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996)—is identified and tagged as a
potential wave.  To confirm a potential
wave as an actual wave, the following
simulation procedure is followed to
construct the distribution of merger
concentrations that facilitates the test-
ing of the economic significance of
each merger wave concentration. The
total number of merger bids for a given
industry over the 120-month sample
period (i.e., 10 years x 12 months) is
identified. Each bid is then randomly
assigned to one of the 120 months with
the probability of assignment being 1/
120 for each month. This is repeated
1,000 times. Subsequently, the highest
concentration of merger activity within
a 24-month period from each of the
1,000 draws is calculated. The actual
concentration of activity from the po-
tential wave is compared with the em-
pirical distribution based on the simu-
lated data. If the actual peak concen-
tration exceeds the 95th percentile from
that empirical distribution, that period is
coded as a wave. The final result of the
merger simulation in the study of
Soegiharto (2008) is 28 waves.  He
indicates that the average number of
bids during the 24-month wave period
over the 10-year sampling period is 53
whereas the average number of bids
during the 24-month non-wave period
is 14.3. This present study employs the
identical waves identified in the study
of Soegiharto (2008). Merger period is
a dummy variable that takes the value
of one for mergers that occur during
the waves and zero for those that occur
outside the waves.
Measure of Bid Premium
Similar to Soegiharto (2010), Raj
and Forsyth (2003), Hayward and
Hambrick (1997), and Crawford and
Lechner (1996), the acquisition pre-
mium is calculated over the period in
which target stock price is not affected
by information on the merger. In this
study, the window begins 30 trading
days before the first announcement of
the takeover and ends when the offer
is accepted by the target’s sharehold-
ers. Bid premium is calculated as: (bid





Bid offer is the final price paid per
target share by the bidder, and target
price
-30
 is the value of target share 30
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Similar to Harford (2005), this
study employs a set of measures of
operating performance, which consist
of net income [A172] to sales [A12],
assets turnover (sales [A12]/average
of total assets [A6]), return on assets
(operating income [A13]/average of
total assets [A6]), sales [A12] growth,
and market [A24xA25] to book [A60].
The pre-merger operating performance
is the average of years -3 to -1 relative
to the announcement industry-adjusted
performance while the post-merger
industry-adjusted operating perfor-
mance is the average of years +1 to +3
relative to merger completion. This
study does not employ market-based
measures of performance because, as
explained by Healy et al. (1992), it is
difficult to distinguish whether the eq-
uity gains are due to real economic
gains or market inefficiency. In addi-
tion, to unravel this dilemma, they sug-
gest examining merger-related operat-
ing performance using accounting-




To test Prediction 1, this study
compares the means of post-merger
operating performance of five of the
following dummy variables (1 and 0
indicate the value taken): (i) bidders
with overconfident (1) and less over-
confident (0) CEOs, (ii) in-wave (1)
and non-wave (0) mergers, (iii) intra-
(1) and inter- (0) industry mergers, (iv)
stock (1) and cash (0) mergers, and (v)
mergers undertaken following a high
liquidity year (1) and a low liquidity
year (0). The redundant (highly corre-
lated) measures of operating perfor-
mance are removed using the principal
component analysis. Post-merger op-
erating performance is assessed using
the return on assets, net income to
sales, and/or market-to-book ratio. A
high liquidity year is the year in which
the rate spread is below its time-series
median and the industry’s market-to-
book ratio is simultaneously above its
time-series median. The low liquidity
years are all other years.
As presented in Table 2, the re-
sults of the independent sample t-test
(Prediction 1a) are mixed. When Mea-
sure A is used as the proxy for CEO
overconfidence, the findings indicate
that the means of post-merger return
on assets (see Panel A) and post-
merger net income to sales (see Panel
B) are significantly higher for mergers
undertaken by less overconfident CEOs
than those executed by overconfident
CEOs. When Measure B is employed,
the significant difference (at 10% level)
is only present for post-merger return
on assets, implying that the overconfi-
dent CEOs outperform the less over-
confident CEOs (see Panel A). The
most consistent results are yielded by
Measure C (see Panels A, B, and C).
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Table 2. The Difference in the Means of Post-Merger Operating Perfor-
mance
The means are for the following classifications of merger: mergers undertaken by overconfident and less overconfident
CEOs, mergers conducted during merger waves and outside the waves, mergers that involve bidders and targets from the
same and different industries, mergers that use stock and cash as method of payment, and mergers conducted following the
year of high and low liquidity. Measure A, Measure B, and Measure C are used as measures of CEOs’ behavior. The
differences in numbers of observation are due to the missing data and only significant results are presented.
(Panel A) The difference in the means of post-merger return on assets (ROA)
Return on Assets
N Mean S D SE Mean SE Sig.
Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 86 0.053 0.094 0.010 0.025 0.010 0.017
(Measure A)` Overconfident 126 0.029 0.057 0.005
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 63 0.026 0.049 0.006 -0.019 0.011 0.085
(Measure B) Overconfident 174 0.045 0.082 0.006
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 120 0.031 0.076 0.007 -0.039 0.011 0.000
(Measure C) Overconfident 134 0.070 0.095 0.008
Payment Method Cash 61 0.093 0.108 0.014 0.040 0.015 0.009
Stock 113 0.053 0.088 0.008
Liquidity Year of High
Liquidity 153 0.063 0.081 0.007 0.054 0.012 0.000
Year of
Low Liquidity 47 0.009 0.038 0.006
(Panel B) The difference in the means of post-merger net income to sales (NIS)
Return on Assets
N Mean S D SE Mean SE Sig.
Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 80 0.071 0.091 0.010 0.031 0.011 0.006
(Measure A) Overconfident 135 0.040 0.073 0.006
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 109 0.038 0.059 0.006 -0.022 0.010 0.031
(Measure C) Overconfident 129 0.060 0.089 0.008
Merger Period Non-Wave Mergers 172 0.042 0.062 0.005 -0.026 0.011 0.026
Wave Mergers 69 0.067 0.113 0.014
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The differences in the means of the
three measures of post-merger operat-
ing performance employed are signifi-
cantly higher for overconfident CEOs
than for less overconfident CEOs, which
correspond with the results of Mea-
sure B in Panel A. However, these
results are in conflict with those in
Panel A (return on assets) and Panel B
(net income to sales) when Measure A
is used. These conflicting results, which
generally do not support Prediction 1a,
are prevalent since the measures of
CEO overconfidence employed in this
study may capture the CEO overcon-
fidence in different ways.
Up to this point, in general, the
results of the tests indicate that the less
overconfident CEOs are more likely to
generate poorer post-merger operat-
ing performance than the overconfi-
dent CEOs. This finding is in line with
that of Soegiharto (2010) that the less
overconfident CEOs pay higher premi-
ums than do the overconfident CEOs.
Perhaps, the less overconfident CEOs
who pay higher premiums overesti-
mate the value they can create from
the mergers, and do not use their re-
sources optimally following the merg-
ers. As a result, they generate poor
post-merger operating performance.
The other results in Table 2 dem-
onstrate that the means of post-merger
net income to sales (see Panel B) and
the means of post-merger market-to-
book (see Panel C) for in-wave and
non-wave mergers are significantly
different. The means of these two
measures of performance are higher
for in-wave mergers than for non-
wave mergers. These results, which
Continued from Table 2
(Panel C) The difference in the means of post-merger market-to-book (M/B)
Return on Assets
N Mean S D SE Mean SE Sig.
Mean Diff. Diff. (2-tailed)
CEOs’ Behavior Less Overconfident 104 0.428 0.745 0.073 -0.940 0.164 0.000
(Measure C) Overconfident 134 1.368 1.543 0.133
Merger Period Non-Wave Mergers 160 0.784 0.935 0.074 -0.565 0.181 0.002
Wave Mergers 78 1.349 1.853 0.210
Industry of Inter-Industry 106 1.612 1.868 0.181 0.992 0.180 0.000
Merged Firms Intra-Industry 140 0.621 0.886 0.075
Payment Method Cash 56 1.616 1.614 0.216 0.725 0.211 0.001
Stock 102 0.890 1.032 0.102
Liquidity Year of
High Liquidity 133 0.946 0.941 0.082 0.698 0.140 0.000
Year of
Low Liquidity 53 0.248 0.611 0.084
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do not confirm Prediction 1b, may oc-
cur as there are many targets available
during merger waves, and bidders could
choose targets that are most favorable
to them and, ultimately, they could
produce better post-merger operating
performance.
For mergers that involve bidders
and targets from the same or different
industries, a significant difference only
appears in the means of post-merger
market-to-book (see Panel C). The
means of this measure is higher for
inter-industry mergers than for intra-
industry mergers. This evidence, which
does not support Prediction 1c, sug-
gests that bidders that acquire targets
from different industries may have an
opportunity to take advantage from
conglomeration, for instance, by bring-
ing down the level of their exposure to
risks.
The means of post-merger return
on assets (see Panel A) and post-
merger market-to-book (see Panel C)
are significantly different for  mergers
financed with stock and those with
cash, and for mergers undertaken fol-
lowing a year of high liquidity and those
following a year of low liquidity. The
means of these two measures of per-
formance are higher for cash mergers
than for stock mergers (supporting
Prediction 1d) but are also higher for
mergers undertaken following the year
of high liquidity than those conducted
following the year of low liquidity (Pre-
diction 1e is not substantiated). The
finding that stock mergers produce
poorer post-merger operating perfor-
mance relative to cash mergers is con-
sistent with the argument that bidder
CEOs are more likely to pursue their
personal interests at the expense of
shareholders. Meanwhile, the finding
that mergers undertaken following the
high liquidity years generate better post-
merger operating performance may be
due to the bidder CEOs’ better access
to the sources of funds to accommo-
date the reallocation of assets effi-
ciently.
Multivariate Tests
CEO overconfidence, merger pe-
riod, premium paid to the target firm,
the method of payment, the industry of
merged firms, capital liquidity, pre-
merger operating performance, pre-
merger free cash flows, pre-merger
leverage, CEO tenure, and CEO stock
ownership are variables that may af-
fect the bidders’ post-merger operat-
ing performance (Prediction 2). Pre-
merger performance includes net in-
come to sales, assets turnover, return
on assets, sales growth, and market-to-
book ratio. Free cash flow is calculated
as operating income – (taxes + interest
+ preferred dividend + common divi-
dend), and leverage is calculated as
long-term debt divided by book value of
equities. The difference between the
date an individual becomes a CEO and
the date the merger announced is used
to determine the CEO tenure. The
number of shares owned by a CEO is
divided by the number of shares out-
standing to obtain the CEO stock own-
ership.
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It is generally acknowledged that
the extra value that can be extracted
from the target firms by the bidder
CEOs are reflected on the premiums
paid to the targets. Hayward and
Hambrick (1997) argue that premium
is important not only on account of its
function as the statement of pricing and
the bidder’s expectation, but also due
to its effect on post-merger operating
performance. Similarly, Roll (1986)
reveals that the mistake of paying too
much, stemming from management
who overrate the value created and
synergistic gains from an M&A, ulti-
mately damages the operating perfor-
mance following the M&A. This argu-
ment implies that the bidders’ poor
post-merger performance may be
driven by the high premiums they have
paid to the target firms. Prior to the test
of Prediction 2, this study examines this
relation using the regression analysis
and employs the following measures of
post-merger performance: net income
to sales, assets turnover, return on
assets, sales growth, and market-to-
book ratio. The results of the regres-
sion analysis, as presented in Table 3,
indicate that the amount of premiums
paid do not exert any effect on the
bidders’ post-merger operating perfor-
mance.
It is hypothesized that the relation-
ship between the amount of premiums
paid and the post-merger operating
performance may be affected by CEO
behavior, merger period, the method of
payment, and the industry of merged
firms. However, as there is not any
relationship between the premiums paid
and post-merger operating perfor-
mance, it is not possible to test the
indirect effect of the four influencing
factors mentioned on the relationship
between the two variables. This paper,
Table 3.Predicting Post-Merger Operating Performance Using Premiums
Paid to Targets
Net Income Assets Return on Sales Market-to-
to Sales Turnover Assets Growth Book
Intercept 0.067 -0.042 0.025 -0.033 1.408
[0.000] [0.292] [0.000] [0.083] [0.000]
Premiums Paid -0.027 -0.112 0.004 0.037 0.169
[0.158] [0.115] [0.874] [0.281] [0.682]
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.006 0.263 0.001 -0.003
SE of the Estimate 0.087 0.350 0.086 0.167 1.989
p-value for F-test 0.158 0.115 0.000 0.281 0.682
Number of observations 258 258 258 258 258
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therefore, investigates the direct effect
of the explanatory variables employed
on the post-merger operating perfor-
mance. As the post-merger perfor-
mance is measured using several vari-
ables, the redundant (highly correlated)
variables are removed using the princi-
pal component analysis. This analysis
indicates that post-merger performance
is best assessed by return on assets
(which has the highest score in the
component matrix), net income to sales,
and/or market-to-book ratio.
Although the results in Table 3 do
not show any effect of premiums paid
on post-merger operating performance,
it remains sensible to test the influence
of variables on the premiums paid to
the targets firms. These variables, col-
lectively, may also affect the bidders’
post-merger operating performance.
The Effects of the Combination of
Measures of CEO Behavior and
Classified Predictors on Post-
Merger Performance
Firstly, in the multivariate tests,
this study individually regresses thir-
teen predictors (see Appendix 1) on
return on assets (Panel A), net income
to sales (Panel B), and market-to-book
(Panel C). Secondly, each of the mea-
sures of CEO overconfidence (three
of the predictors used) is added to the
other individual predictors employed to
construct new regression models. The
results of these two tests are discussed
along with the results of the third test
(this section). Tables for the results of
the first two tests are not presented, but
are available upon request.
In the third test, the predictors are
classified into four groups: (1) account-
ing number factors, (2) financing fac-
tors, (3) merger factors, and (4) CEO
factors (other than CEO behavior). In
the discussion, the results of this test
are compared to those of the first and
the second tests. In Model A, Model B,
and Model C, each of the measures of
CEO overconfidence is added to each
of the groups constructed. As pre-
sented in Appendix 1, the results—
compared to those in the first and the
second tests—indicate that the pre-
merger leverage remains a variable
that negatively and significantly af-
fects return on assets, net income to
sales, and market-to-book (see Panel
A, Panel B, and Panel C). In Panel A
of Appendix 1, capital liquidity remains
a significant predictor in Model A2
only, which is consistent with the find-
ings in the first and the second tests.
The effect of capital liquidity in Model
B2 and Model C2 in Panel A of Appen-
dix 1 is not consistent with the results of
the first and the second tests. For the
method of payment, the effect remains
significant only in Model C2 in Panel A
of Appendix 1, which is consistent with
results of the first and the second tests.
The effect of the industry of
merged firms, which has a significant
effect on return on assets in the second
test, is no longer significant (see Model
B3, Panel A, Appendix 1). Similar to
the results of the second test, those in
Model A in Panel A of Appendix 1
indicate that the overconfident CEOs
are more likely to produce poorer post-
merger return on assets. On the other
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hand, in Model C (Panel A, Appendix
1), the overconfident CEOs are more
likely to generate better post-merger
return on assets. Nevertheless, only
Model A2, Model C3, and Model C4
(Panel A of Appendix 1) show signifi-
cant effects on the dependent variable
examined.
In Panel B of Appendix 1, the
effects of the period of merger and
CEO ownership on post-merger net
income to sales are not significant,
which are unlike the effects obtained
from the first and the second tests. The
results of the effect of CEO overcon-
fidence on post-merger net income to
sales in Model A (Panel B, Appendix
1) indicate that the overconfident CEOs
are more likely to produce poorer post-
merger net income to sales. In con-
trast, in Model C (Panel B, Appendix
1), the overconfident CEOs are more
likely to produce better post-merger
net income to sales. The significant
models include Models A2 to A4, and
Model C4 (see Panel B, Appendix 1).
These results are similar to those
emerge in the first and the second
tests.
In Panel C of Appendix 1, the
effect of pre-merger free cash flows
on post-merger market-to-book ratio in
all models (Model 1, Model A1, Model
B1, and Model C1) is significant. These
results are parallel with those from the
second test. However, the coefficient
on this predictor is close to zero, mean-
ing that the impact is economically
unimportant. Capital liquidity also re-
mains a significant predictor in all mod-
els (Model 2, Model A2, Model B2, and
Model C2), which is also consistent
with the results of the second test.
Similarly, the result for the industry of
merged firms in Model C3, Panel C,
Appendix 1 is also in line with that in the
second test, i.e., it significantly and
negatively affects the dependent vari-
able.
For CEO overconfidence, the re-
sults presented in Model A1, Panel C,
Appendix 1 indicate that the overcon-
fident CEOs generate poorer post-
merger market-to-book. In contrast,
the results presented in Model C3 and
Model C4 in the same panel and table
demonstrate that the overconfident
CEOs produce better post-merger
market-to-book. They are consistent
with the findings in the first and the
second tests. This may occur as over-
confident CEOs pay less amount of
premiums to the target firms (see
Soegiharto 2010), and perhaps because
they are convinced that they estimate
the values of the targets correctly. The
results of CEO stock ownership indi-
cate that the effect of this variable on
post-merger market-to-book, in Model
1 and Model A1, is significantly nega-
tive. In addition, the results of CEO
tenure, in all models, indicate a positive
and significant impact of this variable
on post-merger market-to-book. In the
second test, these last two predictors,
however, show no significant effect on
the dependent variable.
As shown in Appendix 1 (and also
the results from the second test), there
is conflicting evidence concerning the
effect of CEO overconfidence on the
post-merger performance. On one
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hand, when Measure C is employed,
the results in general exhibit that CEO
overconfidence significantly and posi-
tively affects each of the three post-
merger performance measures. On
the other hand, when Measure A is
used, the results also demonstrate a
significant but negative effect of CEO
overconfidence on each of the depen-
dent variables employed. Additionally,
when Measure B is used, none of CEO
overconfidence significantly affects the
measures of post-merger performance.
These findings suggest that each of the
measures of CEO behavior may cap-
ture CEO overconfidence differently.
It is argued that Measure A—
classifying a CEO as overconfident if
the percentage of options he or she
exercises is smaller than both the an-
nual average percentage and industry-
year average percentage—better
gauges the CEO overconfidence as
holding options until certain date, indi-
cating the CEO conviction that his or
her company will perform better and
its stock price will increase further. In
addition, the comparison with the an-
nual average percentage and the in-
dustry-year average percentage en-
hances the validation of this measure.
Measure B only focuses on the in-
crease in the number of shares the
CEO owns (irrespective of whether he
or she exercises the options). Ignoring
the exercising/unexercising of stock
options may weaken this measure. On
the other hand, Measure C disregards
the increase in the number of shares
owned by the CEO, and the CEO is
classified as overconfident if the aver-
age value that the CEO would have
realized at year end—if he or she had
exercised all of the vested options that
had an exercise price below the market
price—is greater than the net average
value realized from exercising the op-
tions. This measure is valid to gauge
individual CEO overconfidence, but it
is not as robust as Measure A since it
does not take into account the annual
average difference and the industry-
year average difference. Hence, it is
concluded that the findings that indi-
cate a negative and significant effect
of CEO overconfidence on post-merger
operating performance support the pre-
diction developed.
The Effects of the Combination of
Measures of CEO Behavior and
Groups of Classified Predictors on
Post-Merger Performance
In the final regression analysis, the
groups of predictors are combined into
several models, and these combined
groups are regressed on each of the
dependent variables employed (see
Appendix 2). Each measure of CEO
overconfidence, i.e., Measure A, Mea-
sure B, and Measure C, is added into
Model A, Model B, and Model C,
respectively. In the full model, the pre-
miums paid to the target firms and each
of the measures of pre-merger perfor-
mance are also included as predictors.
As can be seen in Appendix 2, in
general, the results indicate that pre-
merger leverage, the method of pay-
ment, and capital liquidity no longer
significantly affect each of the three
dependent variables. On the contrary,
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the industry of merged firms becomes
a variable that positively and signifi-
cantly affects  post-merger return on
assets and post-merger net income to
sales (see Panel A and Panel B). This
suggests that intra-industry mergers
lead to better post-merger perfor-
mance, substantiating the conjecture
made and consistent with the finding of
Heron and Lie (2002) that operating
performance improvement is signifi-
cantly greater when the bidder and the
target firm belong to the same industry.
The premiums paid to the target
firms, included in the full model, also
becomes a factor that negatively and
significantly explains return on assets
and net income to sales (see Panel A
and Panel B). These findings mean
that the higher the premiums paid, the
lower the post-merger performance,
supporting the prediction made. The
results are also in line with Roll’s (1986)
study which finds that the payment of
higher premiums to the target firms
damages the performance following
the mergers. In addition, pre-merger
free cash flows, in general, also be-
come a factor that positively and sig-
nificantly affects the post-merger re-
turn on assets and the post-merger
market-to-book (see Panel A and Panel
C). However, the coefficient on this
predictor is close to zero, suggesting
that the effect of this predictor is eco-
nomically unimportant.
The period of merger is also a
variable that generally has a positive
and significant impact on the three
dependent variables employed (see the
full model). This suggests that in-wave
mergers lead to better post-merger
performance, which does not support
the hypothesis. It can also be seen in
Appendix 2 that pre-merger return on
assets, pre-merger net income to sales,
and pre-merger market-to-book have
positive and significant effects on post-
merger return on assets, post-merger
net income to sales, and post-merger
market-to-book, respectively (see the
full model). This proves that the higher
the bidders’ pre-merger performance,
the better their post-merger perfor-
mance will be. Finally, as shown in all
panels of Appendix 2, CEO behavior,
in general, has no effect on post-merger
performance.
Conclusion
In this study, the tests on the dif-
ferences in post-merger operating per-
formance for M&As undertaken by
overconfident and less overconfident
CEOs, for in-wave and non-wave
mergers, for stock and cash mergers,
for within and cross-industrial merg-
ers, and for mergers undertaken in a
high and a low liquidity year are con-
ducted. Moreover, the investigation on
whether these five variables—CEO
behavior, merger period, the method of
payment, the industry of merged firms,
and liquidity period—plus premiums
paid to the target firms, affect post-
merger operating performance is also
performed.
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In some models employed, CEO
overconfidence—the major predictor
examined in this study—has a conflict-
ing effect on the post-merger operating
performance. On one hand, when
Measure C is employed, the results of
the tests, in general, indicate that CEO
overconfidence significantly and posi-
tively affects the post-merger perfor-
mance. On the other hand, when Mea-
sure A is used, the results of the tests,
overall, also demonstrate a significant
but negative effect of the CEO over-
confidence on the post-merger perfor-
mance. When Measure B is used,
however, none of CEO overconfidence
significantly affects the measures of
post-merger performance. These con-
firm the mixed findings in the univariate
tests conducted. Overall, the findings
suggest that each of the behavioral
measures designed in this study may
capture CEO overconfidence in differ-
ent ways. Therefore, a better measure
needs to be designed, and its effect on
post-merger performance needs to be
re-examined by future researchers.
The result for the period of merger
generally indicates that mergers un-
dertaken during merger waves have a
positive and significant effect on the
post-merger operating performance.
This basically means that in-wave
mergers lead to better post-merger
operating performance, this may occur
as there are many targets available
during the merger waves and bidders
could choose one which is the most
favorable to them. This, in turn, will
result in better post-merger operating
performance for the merged firms.
This finding is also consistent with that
in the univariate tests.
Another result of this study indi-
cates that the industry of merged firms,
in general, positively and significantly
affects the post-merger operating per-
formance, implying that intra-industry
mergers lead to better post-merger
performance. This evidence is perhaps
caused by the fact that managing a
focused firm is relatively less difficult
than managing a diversified firm, and
the bidder CEO might already have
better experience and knowledge of
the target’s businesses. The result of
univariate tests, however, does not
show any significant difference in the
post-merger operating performance
between intra- and inter-industry merg-
ers.
The result of regression analysis
also demonstrates that the premiums
paid to the target firms negatively and
significantly affect the post-merger
operating performance. This finding
suggests that the higher the premiums
paid, the lower the post-merger operat-
ing performance will be. Stated differ-
ently, by paying high premiums, the
bidder CEOs destroy the value of the
mergers. It is argued in this study that
the poor post-merger operating perfor-
mance may result from the bidder CEO
overconfidence. Overconfident CEOs
may overestimate the values of target
firms, and their overconfidence may
lead them to pay higher premium to the
targets. Such payment of higher premi-
ums ultimately damages the perfor-
mance following the mergers.
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In addition, the result of this study
result shows that the pre-merger oper-
ating performance generally has a posi-
tive and significant effect on the post-
merger operating performance. This
finding indicates that bidders with
higher pre-merger operating perfor-
mance are more likely to generate
better post-merger operating perfor-
mance. In summary, this study pro-
vides evidence that mergers under-
taken outside the waves, inter-industry
mergers, the payment of higher premi-
ums, and poor pre-merger operating
performance lead to the bidders pro-
ducing poor post-merger operating per-
formance.
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